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What are 'Universalizable Interests'? 1 Many of Habermas's critical commentators agree that Discourse Ethics fails as a theory of the validity of moral norms and only succeeds as a theory of the democratic legitimacy of socio-political norms. 2 The reason they give is that the moral principle (U) is too restrictive to count as a necessary condition of the validity of norms. Other more sympathetic commentators want to abandon principle (U) and remodel Discourse Ethics without it. 3 Still others, try to downplay the role of universalizing moral discourse and to make more of
Habermas's less demanding, though still somewhat vague, conception of ethical discourse. 4 Against this chorus of critical voices Habermas maintains that his conception of moral discourse and the moral principle (U) are central to Discourse Ethics in general, and to the normative heart of his political theory in particular.
This conflict may have arisen in part because of the obscurity surrounding the central concept of a 'universalizable interest'. Actually Habermas's concept of interest is pretty obscure too. But the obscurity surrounding the concept of interest is not the issue here. For our present purposes we can simply stipulate that an interest is a reason to want. 5 The obscurity that is the problem here arises from ambiguities in the notion of universalizability that is in play. Once we pay due attention to the conditions of the universalizability of interests contained in
Habermas's formulation of the moral principle (U), we can distinguish between a weaker and a stronger version of it. I argue that only the weaker version is 2 defensible. But I also want to show why Habermas is tempted into defending the stronger version.
The Meaning and Function of Principle (U)
A recent formulation of (U) states that:
a norm is valid if and only if the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its general observance for the interests and value-orientations of each individual could be freely accepted jointly by all concerned. (OCCM p.
354/DEA p. 60) 6 The most recent formulations of (U), unlike the earlier ones, make clear that the amenability to a consensus of interests is a sufficient as well as a necessary condition of a norm's validity. 7 The trouble is that, thus formulated, (U) is fraught with ambiguity. (U) could be taken to mean that in discourse validity is conferred on a norm if and only if everyone can 'freely and jointly' accept it on the basis of an interest in its general observance, though not necessarily the same one. Call this unofficial version of (U), (U) 1 This requirement effectively rules out the unofficial version, (U) 1 .
Unfortunately though, it only partly clears up the ambiguity in (U).
Distributive and Collective Universalizability
Officially then, (U) requires that everyone be able to accept a norm for the same reason, on the basis of the same interest. But this just raises another problem. What is to count as everyone's having the 'same' interest in a norm and as accepting it 'in the same way' or assenting to it 'for the same reason'?
This second problem turns on the question of how interests are individuated.
Take the norm N 1 : 'do not inflict unnecessary pain on others'. This is the kind of norm that the procedure of discourse conforming to (U) should validate. If not, something must be awry with the procedure. For the intuition that everyone has an interest in avoiding pain is very deeply rooted. 10 interests. But such global interests as these are pretty remote from our moral lives, and not at all the kind of thing we would be likely to appeal to in discourse, even implicitly, in order to resolve moral conflicts.
Fortunately not all collectively universalizable interests are so remote.
There are collectively universalizable interests in basic, irreducibly social goods, i.e. goods which everyone wants and which can only be pursued and enjoyed in concert with others. My interest in freedom of expression, to use an example due to Joseph Raz, is not just an interest in my freedom to express myself but one which extends to other people's freedom of expression too. 15 The To avoid this objection we must only note that the suppression of some people's or even one person's interest in free expression is deleterious to the common good of a liberal culture. Similarly, if we assume that the environment is ultimately a global not a local ecological system, we can say that everyone's environment is damaged in some way whenever anyone pollutes it. Assuming further that everyone aims at a good in the highest degree, or in its most complete form, then we are right to say that each person's interest in free 9 expression or in a clean environment for herself implies an interest in free expression or a clean environment for everyone. These interests are therefore collectively and not distributively universalizable in the sense outlined above.
If this is correct, interest I can justify norm N 1 under two different descriptions. For both I 1 and I 2 fulfill the requirement that everybody be able to assent to a norm for the same reason, on the basis of the same interest. In turn, this opens up two further possible interpretations of the official version of (U):
(U) 2 , a norm is valid if and only if it embodies an interest which is either distributively universalizable or collectively universalizable; and (U) 3 , a norm is valid if and only if it embodies a collectively universalizable interest .
Universalizability and Agent-neutrality in Discourse Ethics
So far as I can see, Habermas hedges his bets with regard to (U) 2 and (U) 3. In his response to the objection that (U) sets an implausibly restrictive necessary condition on the justifiability of norms, Habermas endorses (U) 20 It is evident that Habermas must be endorsing (U) 3 . On standard accounts agent-relative reasons include an essential pronominal reference back to the agent; agent-neutral reasons do not. 21 We have already seen that I 1 is agentrelative, because its content, F (x, x's pain), refers back to the interest holder, and that I 2, by contrast, is agent-neutral because it does not. In the passage cited,
Habermas's claim is that not just the moral norms, but also the reasons that justify those norms, must be agent-neutral. 22 The implication is that agent- 3 , and rejecting (U) 2 .
5.
Objections to (U) 3 If I am correct, in the course of the last two decades Habermas has exploited the ambiguity in the official version of (U) by sliding between two different positions. To begin with he explicitly endorses (U) 2 , but later he rejects this and commits himself to (U) 3 . In my view this is a mistake. For (U) 3 makes
Habermas's Discourse Ethics vulnerable to the standard objection to (U). The standard objection is that (U) imposes an implausibly restrictive necessary condition of the validity of moral norms. The most cogent version of this objection is the redundancy argument. According to the redundancy argument (U) sets such strict conditions of universalizability that it leaves few survivors.
Even allowing that those few norms that survive (U) capture our deepest intuitions about what counts as a valid moral norm, it still follows that moral discourse can at most play a peripheral role in our moral lives. 23 But that is tantamount to conceding that moral discourse is not up to the social and pragmatic tasks of resolving conflicts of interest and orienting interaction in the life-world that discourse ethics assigns to it. This raises two further questions.
Why do we life-world inhabitants persist in making moral discourse a central part of our lives if it produces such meager results for social cooperation? And why does Habermas's political and legal theory privilege moral discourse, rather than the mechanisms to which we resort in order to regulate the many conflicts of interest, which cannot be resolved by moral discourse? 
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This imagined community is sufficiently like our own to undermine the intuitive basis of the claim that only collectively universalizable interests are sufficient to justify norms. It is true that morality is more than a matter of enlightened self-interest, indeed more than enlightened 'agent-relative interest' which need not be self-concerned. We can even grant, although it is debatable, that all moral norms are agent-neutral. Certainly very many are. We can accept all this and still deny Habermas's claim that moral norms can only be justified by agent-neutral reasons, and that agent-relative reasons are not sufficient to justify moral norms. Intuition, then, does not support the view that norms must be amenable to a consensus on the basis of agent-neutral reasons furnished by the collectively universalizable interests of participants in discourse. However, it is supposed to be consistent with an empirical moral psychology.
The more Habermas insists on the radical impartiality of moral justification, the harder it will be to hook up Discourse Ethics with a plausible moral psychology.
Thirdly and finally, by thus committing himself to (U) 3 But then it seems that the 'epistemic' basis of the moral requirement that I
give equal weight to the interests of all, friends and strangers alike, cuts moral discourse adrift from a fundamental, orientating and perspective-giving feature of interests, namely, their being in-each-case-mine. 27 This sits ill with the aspiration of discourse theory to provide an intersubjective or interpersonal rather than an objectivist model of the validity of moral norms.
If I am right, all these difficulties can be avoided if Habermas adopts (U) 2 and rejects (U) 3 2 and accepting (U) 3. .
Conclusion
The reasons why Habermas should reject (U) 3 and endorse (U) 2 we have, and no universalist, deontological moral theory worth its salt can afford to ignore them. It would also men that (U) would be less restrictive and not so vulnerable to the standard objection.
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Of course the revision I am proposing will require adjustments elsewhere in the theory. Habermas will have to redraw the 'razor-sharp' distinction that (U) is supposed to make between the moral and the ethical. This is just as well. 
